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Abstract
Trade negotiations occur through time and between the governments of
many countries. An important issue is thus whether the value of conces-
sions that a government wins in a current negotiation may be eroded in a
future bilateral negotiation to which it is not party. In the absence of rules
that govern the bilateral negotiation, we first show that the potential for
opportunistic bilateral agreements is indeed severe. We next identify rules
of negotiation that serve to protect the welfare of governments that are not
participating in the bilateral negotiation. The "reciprocal market access"
rule ensures that the market access of a non-participating country is unal-
tered, and we show that this rule eliminates the potential for opportunistic
bilateral negotiations. This rule, however, has practical limitations, and so
we next consider the negotiation rules that are prominent in GATT practice
and discussion. Our main finding is that the two central rules of GATT -
non-discrimination(MFN) and reciprocity -effectivelymimic the recipro-
cal market access rule, and therefore offer a practical means through which
to protect non-participant welfare and thereby eliminate the potential for
opportunistic bilateral negotiations.
1. Introduction
Over its 50 year history, GATT has served remarkably well to encourage mul-
tilateral trade liberalization. This liberalization has been accomplished through
*Colnnbia University and NBER (Bagwell) and The University of Wisconsin and NBER
(Staiger). We thank Giovanni Maggi, John McLaren and seminar participants at Michigan
State University, Princeton University and The University of Chicago for helpful comments.a series of agreements negotiated among the member countries, and an impor-
tant role of GATT has been to provide a continuous negotiating forum for this
purpose. Each of these agreements amounts essentially to a web of bilateral recip-
rocal exchanges of market access "concessions" between negotiating governments,
secured by commitments to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers, and "multilat-
eralized" by the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle, which requires that each
GATT member offer to every other GATT member access to its markets on non-
discriminatory terms (see Jackson, 1969, pp. 217-248, or Hoekman and Kostecki,
1995, pp. 56-83).
The liberalization that has been achieved through GATT negotiations is espe-
cially noteworthy in light of the fact that negotiations occur through time between
the governments of various countries. This feature raises the possibility that the
market access implied by existing tariff commitments may be altered by tariff
commitments made at some point in the future. A particular concern is that the
value of concessions that a government wins today may be eroded in a future
bilateral negotiation to which it is not party. Taking the argument a step further,
if governments recognize that current market access relations may be vulnerable
to opportunistic bilateral agreements in the future, then they may exchange con-
cessions with trepidation. A multilateral trade organization such as GATT (now
the WTO) is thus more likely to effectively achieve its objectives, if it includes
rules of negotiation that serve to protect the value of previous concessions won by
governments that are not participating in current bilateral negotiations.
This discussion suggests a pair of interesting theoretical questions. First, in
the absence of rules that govern the nature of negotiations, to what extent are
governments engaged in a bilateral negotiation able to appropriate welfare from
non-participating governments? In other words, is there a robust theoretical basis
from which to conclude that the possibility of a future bilateral agreement between
other governments represents an important concern for a given government? Sec-
ond, if this concern is indeed legitimate, then how effective are GATT's rules in
protecting the welfare of non-participating governments and thereby alleviating
this concern?
These questions are of more than theoretical interest. GATT Dispute Panels
consistently recognize that the value of a tariff concession is the improved market
access which it represents. Accordingly, when a government takes some action
that "nullifies or impairs" a previous concession made to some trading partner,
that partner has a potentially legitimate basis from which to file a complaint.1
view is exemplified by the following excerpt from a GATT panel report (concerning
2These complaints are handled under GATT Article XXIII, and they may take
several forms. A "violation complaint" occurs when a government is alleged to
have broken an explicit GATT rule. A second possibility is a "non-violation"
complaint. As Petersmann (1997) details, the three conditions established by
GATT panels for a successful non-violation complaint are that: (1). a reciprocal
concession was negotiated between two trading partners; (2). a subsequent action
was taken by one government, which, though consistent with GATT articles,
adversely affected the market access afforded to its trading partner; and (3). this
action could not have been reasonably anticipated by this partner at the time of
the negotiation of the original tariff concession. There are a variety of actions that
have instigated complaints (of either form), including domestic subsidies, product
re-classifications, and bilateral trade negotiations with other partners. We focus
on the latter possibility here.2
To address these questions, we develop a general-equilibrium model of trade in
two goods between three countries. In particular, we assume that a home country
exports one good to two foreign countries in exchange for imports from them of
a second good. Following our earlier work (Bagwell and Staiger, forthcoming),
we represent the objectives of each government as a general function of its local
prices and terms of trade. This approach has several advantages. For instance, it
is very general, being consistent both with the traditional view that governments
maximize national income by their tariff choices and with the view embodied in
leading political-economy models that governments are concerned about the dis-
tributional impacts of their tariff choices as well. In addition, by representing
government preferences in this way, the channel through which one government's
the US complaint regarding EEC subsidies for domestic oilseed producers):
"...the main value of a tariff concession is that it provides an assurance of better market access
through improved price competition. Contracting parties negotiate tariff concessions primarily
to obtain that advantage. They must therefore be assumed to base their tariff negotiations on
the expectation that the price effect of the tariff concessions will not be systematically offset.
If no right of redress were given to them in such a case, they would be reluctant to make tariff
concessions and the General Agreement would no longer be useful as a legal framework for
incorporating the results of trade negotiations." (as quoted in Petersmann, 1997, p. 168)
2recent example of a bilateral agreement that has led to a violation nullification-and-
impairment complaint is the on-going US-EC dispute over the EC trade policy with respect
to bananas. Examples of bilateral agreements that have led to non-violation nuffification-and-
impairment complaints are (i). the US complaint regarding tariff preferences negotiated by
the EC on citrus products from certain Mediterranean countries, and (ii). the EC complaint
regarding aspects of the bilateral agreement between the US and Japan concerning trade in
semi-conductor products.
3tariff choices impose an externality on another government's welfare is made clear.
This helps to make transparent both the means through which negotiating gov-
ernments may appropriate the welfare of a non-participating government and the
manner in which various rules of negotiation may limit this endeavor.
Within this framework, we hypothesize that the governments have achieved
an initial multilateral trade agreement, and we then consider the scope for a sub-
sequent mutually-beneficial bilateral agreement between the home country and
one of its foreign trading partners. We are especially interested in opportunistic
bilateral agreements, in which the bilateral gains come at the expense of the wel-
fare of the non-participating foreign government. We thus focus primarily upon
initial agreements that are efficient (given governments' preferences), as then a
bilateral gain is possible only if the welfare of the excluded foreign government
is diminished. As a by-product, our analysis therefore also answers a more spe-
cific question: If governments are able to achieve an efficient multilateral trade
agreement, is this agreement "stable" against future bilateral negotiations?
From this perspective, we assess the stability of an initial multilateral trade
agreement among the three countries to the possibility of future bilateral trade
agreements between the home country and either of its two trading partners. We
explore this issue in the context of a variety of different rules that may govern the
structure of the bilateral agreement. To begin, we consider a most-basic set of rules
that do no more than capture the essential meaning of a bilateral negotiation. In
particular, these basic rules recognize that the tariff of foreign country jdoesnot
change as part of any bilateral agreement between the home country and foreign
country i. Otherwise, the basic rules with which we begin are very permissive:
they allow that the home country can impose discriminatory tariffs against the
imports from its trading partners, and even that the home country's tariff on
imports from foreign country jisnot bound by the initial agreement when it
negotiates with foreign country i. Not surprisingly, in this permissive setting,
we observe that the welfare of the non-participating foreign government is poorly
protected. Indeed, under these basic rules, no initial efficient agreement is stable.
We next strengthen the rules of negotiation and impose that a tariff concession
made in the initial agreement is "bound" and cannot be reversed in a subsequent
bilateral negotiation, unless the trading partner on whose exports the bound tariff
applies is represented. We note that bindings may be either strict (a commitment
to a particular tariff level) or weak (a commitment to a maximum tariff level),
where the latter is the interpretation of bindings adopted in GATT. But despite
this additional restriction, we confirm that a fundamental problem of bilateral
4opportunism still accompanies any efficient set of tariffs: starting from any initial
set of efficient tariffs, the home country and foreign country i can always find a
way to negotiate further changes in their tariffs on each other's imports which
benefit them at the expense of country j.Thekey point is that, by lowering the
tariffs that they apply to one another, the governments of the home country and
foreign country i cause a terms of trade loss for foreign country j.Ineffect, the
governments of the home country and foreign country i convert this loss into their
own gain, thereby rendering unstable any efficient tariff combination, even when
the tariff that the home government applies to exports from foreign country jis
bound (strictly or weakly).
Having demonstrated that the bilateral opportunism problem is not resolved
by a bindings restriction alone, we next consider further restrictions on the rules
of negotiation. We first consider a "reciprocal market access rule." This rule,
which is closely related to the Kemp-Wan rule (Kemp and Wan, 1976) that has
been developed for preferential trading agreements, requires that bilateral nego-
tiations between the home government and the government of foreign country i
not upset the "market access relations" (i.e., bilateral trade volumes) between the
home country and foreign country j.Whateverthe particular representation of
the welfare of the government of foreign country j,wefind that bilateral tariff ad-
justments that conform to this rule preserve the welfare of the non-participating
government. The reciprocal market access rule therefore directly precludes the
possibility that a future bilateral agreement may appropriate welfare from a non-
participating government. An immediate consequence is that every initial efficient
tariff vector is stable when any future bilateral negotiation must conform to this
rule, and hence the reciprocal market access rule "solves" the bilateral oppor-
tunism problem.
While the reciprocal market access rule has this desirable property, we note
that this rule also has some practical limitations. Primary among them is that this
rule implants a multilateral element into a bilateral negotiation. For instance, if
the governments of the home country and foreign country i form a bilateral agree-
ment in which they lower the tariffs that they apply to one another's exports,
then the reciprocal market access rule requires as well that the government of
the home country appropriately lowers the tariff that applies to exports from the
non-participating foreign country j.Ideally,one would prefer a set of rules for
bilateral negotiations that do not require subtle adjustments in the tariffs that
apply to non-participants. Indeed, GATT does not contain an explicit reciprocal
market access rule. It might be argued that Article XXIII serves as an implicit
5reciprocal market access rule, as it permits a government to file a non-violation
complaint if it believes that its market access has been compromised by the (law-
ful) negotiations of others, but this approach is likely to prove cumbersome as a
general solution to the problem of bilateral opportunism. With such considera-
tions in mind, we therefore turn to the rules that are actually imposed in GATT
and investigate whether they might be interpreted as offering a more practical
solution to the bilateral opportunism problem. Two of GATT's central rules are
non-discrimination and reciprocity. The former refers to the requirement that all
tariffs conform to the MFN principle. The latter refers to the convention that
negotiations result in tariff adjustments that generate equal changes in import
and export volumes across negotiating partners. We are interested in the ex-
tent to which these essential elements of GATT law and practice may limit the
ability of negotiating governments to appropriate welfare from non-participating
governments.
We first consider the MFN rule. This rule changes the tariff-setting environ-
ment in a direct way: owing to the common treatment of foreign trading partners
that the MFN rule requires, efficient outcomes that would require discriminatory
tariffs are no longer feasible. This is a potential cost of MFN, which must be
weighed against any potential stability benefits. However, despite the requisite
common treatment of foreign trading partners, we find that the potential stability
benefits of the MFN rule are limited. For example, in the absence of bindings,
we find that every MFN-efficient tariff vector save one (corresponding to multi-
lateral free trade when governments maximize national income) is unstable. The
addition of bindings restrictions enhances the stabilizing properties of MFN, but
even with bindings a range of MFN-efficient tariff vectors continue to be unstable
under the MFN rule. Hence, the MFN requirement partially resolves the bilateral
opportunism problem, but it alone cannot solve this problem completely.
We then introduce a further restriction on bilateral negotiations, and suppose
that the initial tariff vector conforms to the MFN requirement and that any future
bilateral negotiation must satisfy both the MFN rule and the rule of reciprocity.
Our central finding is that, together, these two rules effectively mimic the recip-
rocal market access rule, serving to stabilize every MFN-efficient tariff vector. In
essence, while the emphasis that governments place on reciprocity is often criti-
cized as reflecting unsound "mercantilist" reasoning, we demonstrate that in the
presence of MFN the rule of reciprocity is transformed into the reciprocal market
access rule, and thus has the desirable by-product of maintaining the welfare of
any unrepresented government. In this way, GATT's rules of MFN and reciprocity
6can be understood to provide a solution to the problem of bilateral opportunism.
If GATT's rules solve the bilateral opportunism problem, then what are we to
make of non-violation nullification-and-impairment complaints against countries
who have undertaken bilateral negotiations with other partners? After all, under
such complaints there is no allegation that any of GATT's rules have been broken.
We make two observations which help to place our results in context. First, while
we model MFN and reciprocity as formal and rigid rules, their application in
GATT practice is more qualified. For example, GATT Article XXIV embodies an
important exception to the MFN rule, as this article stipulates conditions under
which the formation of discriminatory preferential agreements is permitted. Like-
wise, the application of reciprocity in GATT has elements of both formal rules and
informal norms. A second observation in this regard is that new complications
arise when many goods are considered. In the penultimate section of the paper,
we show that MFN and reciprocity continue to solve the terms-of-trade driven bi-
lateral opportunism problem, but an additional problem of bilateral opportunism
(associated with local price movements) may still arise under these rules in limited
circumstances.
With these observations in mind, we interpret our results as describing the
broad role that MFN and reciprocity may play in limiting the scope for bilat-
eral opportunism. Our findings also identify important exceptions to these rules
(e.g., preferential agreements) under which opportunism may be a heightened
concern. More generally, we conclude from these observations that the rules of
MFN and reciprocity may be understood in GATT practice as providing a "first
line of defense" against the problem of bilateral opportunism, thereby reducing
the number of valid non-violation complaints and easing the judicial burden of
the GATT dispute settlement procedures, and that the ability of governments to
bring non-violation complaints can serve an important role as a "second line of
defense" against this problem.
This paper is related to a growing literature concerned with interpreting the
institutional features of GATT.3 Papers by Caplin and Krishna (1988), Ludema
(1991), and McCalman (1997) focus on evaluating the properties of tariff negotia-
tions under MFN, but they do not consider the bilateral opportunism problem that
is our focus here, nor do they explore the effects of reciprocity (see Staiger, 1995,
Our paper is also related to recent work in contract theory where one player negotiates
contracts with each of several other players, and the final actions by these other players impose
externalities upon one another (see McAfee and Schwartz, 1994, for an early application in
which a manufacturer negotiates with two retailers).
7for a review of this literature). Our earlier paper (Bagwell and Staiger, forth-
coming) takes as its focus GATT's rules of reciprocity and non-discrimination,
but emphasizes other applications of the reciprocity rule in GATT, and develops
the related but distinct view that reciprocity and non-discrimination offer govern-
ments a path of escape from a terms-of-trade-driven Prisoners' Dilemma. Finally,
Ethier (1998) independently raises some of the issues we consider here.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model in a discrimina-
tory tariff-setting environment. Section 3 defines a criterion with which different
negotiation rules might be assessed. Section 4 then characterizes the set of effi-
cient tariffs in discriminatory environments, identifies the fundamental bilateral
opportunism problem, and evaluates the reciprocal market access rule as a possi-
ble solution to this problem. Section 5 considers an MFN environment, confirms
that the problem of bilateral opportunism remains, and shows that reciprocity
and MFN together provide the solution. An illustrative 2-stage negotiation game
is presented in Section 6 to more fully evaluate the implications of our findings for
bargaining outcomes. A many-goods extension of our main results is contained
in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes. Omitted proofs are collected in an
Appendix section.
2. The Model
In this section, we define a two-good general-equilibrium model of trade between
three countries. We describe as well a general set of preferences for governments
that allows for both economic and political considerations. The model and pref-
erences are similar to those presented in Bagwell and Staiger (forthcoming).
2.1. The Economic Environment
We assume that there is one home country and two foreign countries who trade
two goods, x and y, that are normal goods in consumption and produced under
conditions of increasing opportunity costs. Production takes place under perfect
competition, facing tariffs on imports by each country. To simplify the exposi-
tion of our findings, we suppose that each foreign country trades only with the
home country, who imports x from each of its two foreign trading partners in
exchange for exports of y. The home country is thus the only country that has
8the opportunity to set discriminatory tariffs across its trading partners.4
We now introduce price notation. The home local relative price is denoted as
P where Px (py) is the local price of good x (y) in the home country.
Similarly, the local relative price in foreign country i is denoted as p p*i/p*i
for i = 1,2. The ad valorem tariff that the home country places on imports of x
from foreign country i is denoted as t, for i= 1,2, and t is the ad valorem tariff
levied by foreign country i on imports of y from the home country.5 Throughout,
we assume that these tariffs are non-prohibitive. We define the "world" (i.e.,
untaxed) relative price for trade between the home country and foreign country i
as pWZp'/Py. Letting rt(1+ t) and r (1 + t*i), we then may represent
local prices in terms of world prices and tariffs: p = p(yi,pwi) and p =
pwz/T*tp*2(y*Zpw1)As these expressions indicate, local prices are determined,
once tariffs and world prices are given.
It is important to observe that world prices are linked across bilateral trading
relationships:
pU)t = [Tu/ru]p1i. (2.1)
One possibility is that the tariff policy of the home country is non-discriminatory
(i.e., the home country adopts MFN tariffs). In this case, we have that r1=
andhence there is a single world price: pW pW for i =1,2.On the other hand,
if the home country discriminates with its tariff policy, then y2 and hence
there are different world prices: pw2 Finally,we note that the terms of
trade for foreign country i is given simply as ptL•
We consider next the production, consumption, import and export volumes
in each country. We begin with foreign country i. Production in this country
is determined by selecting the point on its production possibilities frontier at
which the marginal transformation between x and y is equal to the local rela-
tive price: Q= Q*z(p*i)for z= x,y. Consumption is a function of the local
relative price -whichdefines the trade-off faced by consumers and determines
the level and distribution of factor income in the economy -andof tariff revenue
R*Z, which is distributed lump-sum to the consumers in foreign country i and
4This trading pattern will arise when the home (each foreign) country is a natural importer
of x (y), provided that discriminatory tariffs do not upset the natural pattern of trade. The
latter will be assured, for example, if there exist transportation costs between foreign countries
that are large when compared to the extent to which home tariffs may be discriminatory. Our
assumptions serve only to ensure that it is possible for the home country to set discriminatory
tariffs without prohibiting trade between it and its less-favored trading partner.
Lerner symmetry theorem ensures that trade taxes or subsidies can be equivalently
depicted as applying to exports or to imports in this two-sector general-equilibrium setting.
9which we measure in units of the export good y at local prices. We represent
consumption as=D(p*i,R*z) for z= x,y. Tariff revenue is defined implic-
itly by R*i =[D(p*2,R*2) —Q;i(p*i)][1/p*i1/pW] or R*i =R*t(p*i,p),and
we note that tariff revenue is an increasing function of foreign country i's terms
of trade, under the assumption that goods are normal. National consumption
for foreign country i can thus be written as C(p*i, pwi)D(p*t, R*(p*i, pwi))
for z= x,y. Finally, for foreign country i, imports of good y are represented
as M (p*i pwi) C (p*i pwi) —Q*t(p*i) ,andexports of good x are given as
(p*i pwi)Q*i (p*i) —C(p*i pwi) In this way, for each foreign country, the
production, consumption, import and export quantities are determined, once tar-
iffs and world prices (and thus foreign local prices) are given.
We turn now to the corresponding volumes in the home country. The home
country has multiple trading partners, with whom it may experience different
terms of trade, and this complicates somewhat the expression of domestic quanti-
ties. This complication does not affect the determination of domestic production,
which is found at the point on the domestic production possibilities frontier where
the marginal transformation between x and y is equal to the local relative price:
Q= Q() forz= r,y. And domestic consumption of each good is likewise
determined as a function of the local relative price and domestic tariff revenue:
D(p, R) for z= x,y, where tariff revenue is distributed lump-sum to domestic
consumers and measured in units of the export good x in local prices. But, in light
of the possibility of discriminatory tariffs, domestic tariff revenue depends upon
both the total volume of x imported by the domestic country and the composition
of this given volume across the foreign trading partners.




We then define the domestic country's multilateral terms of trade by the trade-
weighted average of the set of bilateral world prices:
T(p*l,p*2,pt,p702) .pW€
i=1,2
With this definition, domestic tariff revenue can be represented implicitly as
6Obsee that T is in fact a measure of the reciprocal of domestic terms of trade: an im-
provement in the domestic country's terms of trade corresponds to a lower value for T.
10R =[D(p,R)—Q(p)].St(p*l,p*2,p ,pw2).(p_pwz) =[D(p,R)—Q(p)].[p—TI,
i=1,2
or R R(p,T).
We now may represent the domestic country's consumption as C(p, T)
D(p, R(p, T)) for z= x,y. Home country imports of x thus may be denoted as
M(p, T) C(p, T) —Q(p)while home country exports of y may be represented
as E(p, T) Q,(p)— C(p,T). In what follows, we will refer to T simply as the
home country's terms of trade. Notice from (2.1) that, if the home country adopts
an MFN tariff policy, then T = pW.However, a discriminatory tariff policy
implies that T pl for all i. Observe that domestic production, consumption,
import and export volumes are all implied, once the world prices and tariffs (and
thus the local prices and terms of trade) are given.
Finally, we consider the trade balance and market-clearing conditions. Home




f*2(p*ipWz)= pW2 E(p*i,p),i =1,2 (2.3)
We now suppose that domestic and foreign tariffs, {r', -r2}and{*l, *2}re-
spectively, are given, and consider the determination of the world prices. One
restriction on world prices is given by the market-clearing requirement:
=E(p",p') (2.4)
z=1,2
Combining the market-clearing requirement (2.4) with the linkage condition (2.1),
we thus have two restrictions with which to determine the two equilibrium world
prices as functions of the given tariffs. We represent the equilibrium world prices
as wi(r1, y2,T*l,*2)fori=1,2. Notice that market clearing in the y market is
assured by (2.2) and (2.3). Summarizing, with their selections of tariffs, gov-
ernments determine the equilibrium world prices, and this in turn implies the
equilibrium values for all local prices and quantities.
112.2. Prices and Tariffs
Our next step is to impose some structure on the manner in which tariffs affect
prices. We consider both the possibility that the home country is able to set
discriminatory tariffs and the possibility that home tariffs must conform to the
MFN principle. We now impose some basic assumptions, which are maintained
in the interpretation of the analysis that follows in subsequent sections.
Beginning with the discriminatory case, we impose the following assumptions:
(i). T2,T*2) isincreasing in r2, r1 and y*2 and is decreasing in 'r1,
and (ii). 2(r1, 2,*1, *2) isincreasing in r1,and T*2andis decreasing
j y2 Thus, if foreign country i confronts a higher tariff on its exports, then
it experiences a reduction in its terms of trade. On the other hand, if foreign
country i raises its own tariff, or if the other countries raise tariffs on one another,
then foreign country i experiences an improvement in its terms of trade. These
restrictions direct attention to the "standard" case, ensuring that our model does
not succumb to the Lerner paradox.
Next, we consider the case in which the home country selects among MFN
tariffs: r='r2.In this event, we may represent the equilibrium world price
as (T,T*l,r*2). Our assumption for this case is: (T,r*l,T*2) is increasing in
T*i and r2 and is decreasing in r. As above, when foreign country i raises its
own import tariff, or when foreign country jpursuesa more protectionist policy,
foreign country i experiences a terms of trade improvement. We assume further
that an increase in the home (MFN) tariff results in a deterioration of the terms
of trade for foreign country i. This amounts to an assumption that the direct
effect of a higher home tariff on foreign country i's exports outweighs the indirect
effect of the higher home tariff on foreign country j's exports.
2.3. Government Preferences
We next offer a general representation of government preferences. We equip gov-
ernment decision-makers with preferences that allow for a wide range of economic
and political motivations. In particular, we represent the objectives of the home
and foreign governments by the general functions W(p, T) and W*t(p*t, 2)fori
=1,2,where all prices and terms of trade are evaluated at their market-clearing
levels. The assumption that we impose is that, with local prices held fixed, each
government strictly prefers an improvement in its terms of trade: WT(P, T) <0
and W(p*i,)i) > 0.
To understand this assumption, it is useful to refer to Figure 1. There, we
12depict combinations of r2 and T*i that preserve the relative local price in foreign
country i and the world price between it and the home country. Given the re-
lationships between prices and tariffs detailed above, the iso-world-price locus is
positively sloped. For the purpose of this illustration, we suppose further that
an increase inresultsin a decrease in the local relative price in this country.7
Now, let us suppose that we begin at point A. If the home country were to raise
at the same time that foreign country i were to lower r',withthe respective
tariff changes undertaken in a fashion that preserved p, then we would arrive at
point B. Notice that the world price p is lower at point B, and so our assumption
that W (p*Z, p) > 0 simply means that the implied income redistribution from
foreign country i to the home country (associated with the movement from A to
B) results in a loss of welfare for the government of foreign country i.
We emphasize that this representation of government preferences is very gen-
eral. It includes the standard possibility that governments maximize national in-
come as well as the possibility that governments are motivated by distributional
concerns. As we detail in our earlier paper (Bagwell and Staiger, forthcoming),
the leading political-economy models of trade policy can all be captured within
this formulation.8
3. Negotiation Rules and Stable Trade Agreements
With the basic economic model now described, we are prepared to evaluate differ-
ent rules under which trade agreements may be negotiated. In the present section,
our goal is to put forth a criterion with which different negotiation rules might
be assessed. Using this criterion, we evaluate a variety of negotiation rules in
subsequent sections.
In our earlier work (Bagwell and Staiger, forthcoming), we explored how
GATT's rules may help to protect weak governments from exploitation in nego-
tiations with their stronger trading partners, thereby solving a hold-up problem
that could otherwise diminish the participation of weaker governments in GATT.
7jotherwords, local relative prices do not succumb to the Metzler paradox.
8As Baldwin (1987) notes, the political-economy models of trade policy proposed by Ol-
son (1965), Caves (1976), Brock and Magee (1978), Findlay and Wellisz (1982), Feenstra and
Bhagwati (1982) and Hiliman (1982) all fit within this approach. Likewise, Mayer's (1984)
median-voter model, the lobbying models of Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995) and Dixit,
Grossman and Helpman (1997), and Baldwin's (1985) political-constraint model can all be rep-
resented with government preferences of this form.
13Here, we ask whether GATT's rules also serve to protect governments from ex-
ploitation in future negotiations to which they are not party. In particular, we
are interested in whether the rules of negotiation protect the value of the con-
cessions secured by one government as part of an initial multilateral agreement,
when other governments may later enter into further bilateral negotiations.9
As mentioned in the Introduction, the extent to which the rules of negotiation
protect through time the value of concessions is of central importance for the func-
tioning of the GATT system. Indeed, if the rules of negotiation were inadequate
in this regard, then forward-looking governments would approach an initial mul-
tilateral negotiation with caution, with the likely consequence that only modest
concessions would be exchanged. Of course, a complete analysis of this possibility
requires a dynamic model, in which the specific structure of negotiations and the
patience (and probable tenure) of governments are detailed. In a later section of
the paper, we develop a simple dynamic model of negotiations along these lines.
For now, however, we take the initial multilateral agreement as given. Our pur-
pose is to assess the stability of this multilateral agreement to the possibility of
future bilateral trade agreements between the home country and either of its two
trading partners, when the nature of the future bilateral agreement is constrained
by rules of negotiation. In the remainder of this section, we prepare for this anal-
ysis, by offering formal definitions for a "negotiation rule" and a "stable" trade
agreement.
A negotiation rule R is defined by a triplet {AR, Ti,r2}, whereAR C R4 is
the set of exogenous initial tariff vectors, (r', -r2, r, T*2),thatis feasible under
the rule R and r2: AR—*S(AR)is a mapping from each vector of initial tariffs
to the set of all subsets of AR, which we denote as S(AR). We note that the
rules of negotiation operate at two levels. First, the rules may restrict the initial
tariffs that are considered. For example, under the MFN rule, the initial tariffs
must satisfy r1= i2, andwe may capture this with the requirement that AR
{(rr2r*lr*2)i =r2}Second, the rules of negotiation may restrict the
manner in which the home government and foreign government i may change the
existing tariffs, (rl,r2,r*l,r*2), into a vector of new tariffs, (i2*1*2) as
part of their bilateral negotiation. These restrictions are captured by the mapping
r1. Notice that r2 maps into subsets of AR; thus, if, for example, the initial tariffs
are restricted via AR to satisfy the MFN rule, then the new tariff vector must also
91n practice, bilateral trade negotiations are prominent both within official multilateral ne-
gotiation "rounds" and outside of such rounds. In either case, the negotiations must conform
to GATT/WTO rules of negotiation (see Jackson, 1969, PP. 217- 248).
14satisfy this rule.
We place restrictions on bilateral negotiations in two steps. First, we impose
some "basic" restrictions on the mapping r2 that simply capture the meaning of a
bilateral negotiation. These restrictions are maintained throughout the analysis
that follows. Next, in subsequent sections, we refer to particular negotiation rules
that are prominent in GATT practice and discussion. These rules correspond to
further restrictions that may be imposed on bilateral negotiations.
We impose three basic restrictions on the bilateral negotiation mapping, r2.
They are contained in the following:
Assumption 1 (Basic Restrictions): The following basic restrictions are im-
posed on r, for i,j=1,12 and i
(i). if (T', y2, r1, *2)EAR, then (i', y2, T*l, *2) E r(r', ..2, T*l, T*2).
(ii). (1 2 *i *2) eri(T1,T2, y*l, i*2) if and only if (2 1 *2 *1) E r2(2, Ti, s2 *i)
(iii). if (1 2 *1 *2) E r(T1, r2, y*l, *2) then=
In words, we assume that the bilateral negotiation between the governments of
the home country and foreign country i are constrained by certain basic rules,
which may be represented by a mapping r2 that (i). permits these governments to
maintain the initial agreement; (ii). applies symmetrically across the two foreign
trading partners; and (iii). recognizes that r- does not change as part of any
bilateral agreement between the home country and foreign country i.'1
The full family of negotiation rules consistent with Assumption 1 is quite
large and includes a number of important candidate rules for consideration. For
example, as mentioned above, the negotiation rule which always requires MFN
tariffs from the home country is in this family. In this case, the set of feasible
initial tariffs is given as AR = {(r', T2, T*l, *2) = T2}, and, in light of the
basic restrictions just defined, the bilateral negotiation between the governments
of the home country and foreign country i must select tariffs from the subset
{(i2*i*2) 1 2*i =T*}, for i, j=1,2 and ij.
With the definition of a negotiation rule R in hand, we turn next to a formal
definition of stability.
any tariff vector, the first (second) argument is the tariff placed by the home country
on imports from foreign country 1 (2), and the third (fourth) argument is the tariff placed by
foreign country 1 (2) on imports from the home country.
that we do not here restrict whether the government of the home country can alter
as part of a bilateral negotiation with the govermnent of foreign country i. We consider the
corresponding issue of "bindings" in subsequent sections, when we impose further restrictions.
15Definition (Stability): A vector of tariffs (r', r2, 7*l,*2)is stable under nego-
tiation rule R if
(i). (Tl,T2,r*l,r*2) EAR, and
(ii). there does not exist i e{1,2} and (1,2,*1,*2)Eri(rl,r2,r*l,r*2) such
that (1,2, *1, *2) offersa Pareto gain to the governments of the home-country
and foreign-country i as compared to (rl,T2,r*l,r*2).
In other words, a vector of tariffs is stable under negotiation rule R if the tariffs are
consistent with the rule, and the rule precludes future mutually-beneficial bilateral
negotiations between the home government and either foreign government.12 As
mentioned in the Introduction, we are especially interested in the extent to which
a given set of rules serves to stabilize efficient tariff vectors, for then any mutually-
beneficial negotiation would be "opportunistic," i.e., come at the expense of the
excluded government.
Finally, let us be clear about what we are not doing. We are not seeking to
determine the "optimal" rule within the full family of negotiation rules consistent
with Assumption 1. Were we attempting to do so, we might for example consider
a negotiation rule under which governments can only select efficient tariffs in
their initial negotiations (i.e., AR is the efficiency frontier), and then are allowed
only to maintain their initial selection in any subsequent bilateral negotiation
(i.e., r1 is the identity function). This negotiation rule clearly delivers an efficient
outcome, but this is achieved at the cost of a dramatic over-simplification of
the negotiation process. Alternatively, governments might be given veto power
over any subsequent bilateral agreement to which they are not party. This, too,
would ensure that opportunistic bilateral negotiations do not take place, but a
moment's reflection suggests that a unanimous-consent rule has its own important
shortcomings. In sum, we acknowledge that (urimodeled) concerns may make some
rules more practical than others, and we therefore take as our focus the stability
properties of trade agreements reached under the particular negotiation rules that
are prominent in GATT practice and discussion.
12 stabilitycriterion that we employ bears a loose analogy to the concept of Coalition-
Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE), as formally defined by Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987),
in that we fix the tariff of the country outside the bilateral coalition and then consider possible
gains within the coalition. Important differences exist, however. First, we are interested in
bilateral negotiations between trading partners; thus, we do not consider all coalitions, and
there are no subcoalitions (other than singletons). Second, we restrict the behavior of the
coalition members with rules of negotiation, and then ask only if there exist tariffs under which
each of the two coalition members may gain.
164. Efficient Tariffs and Negotiation Rules in Discriminatory
Environments
In this section, we represent government preferences in "reduced form" and strengthen
slightly our basic assumptions. We then characterize the set of efficient tariffs
among the three countries, under the assumption that discriminatory tariffs are
permitted. With this characterization in hand, we next establish that no efficient
tariffs are stable without further restrictions on the rules of negotiation. We then
consider further restrictions on the rules of negotiation under which efficient tariffs
may become stable.
4.1. Government Preferences in Reduced Form
To begin, we represent government welfare in reduced form as a direct function of
tariffs. In particular, let W(rl,r2,r*l,T*2)T'V(p,T)and TW*i(Tl r2 *l*2)
W (p*, p), where all prices and terms of trade are evaluated at their market-
clearing levels.
We now strengthen our basic restrictions slightly, so as to focus on tariffs for
which externalities can be unambiguously signed:
Assumption 2 (Externalities): We restrict AR to include only tariffs for
which, for i,j=1,and ij:
(i).W. > 0 and > 0;
(ii). W <0 and W <0; and
(iii). W>0 and > 0.
Thus, we consider negotiated tariffs at which (i) each government would prefer to
unilaterally raise its tariff; (ii) each government experiences a welfare reduction
when its export good is confronted with a higher tariff from a trading partner;
and (iii) foreign government i is pleased when either the home government raises
its tariff on the exports of foreign country jorforeign government jraisesits
tariff on the exports of the home country. These assumptions yield a negotiation
environment in which each government views a tariff reduction on its part as a
"concession" that is potentially appealing if a trading partner "reciprocates" with
a tariff reduction of its own. Further, foreign government i gains when the level
of protection between foreign country jandthe home country is increased.
These reduced-form preferences are broadly consistent with those attributed
to government trade-policy negotiators (see, e.g., Krugman (1991, 1997)). But
17do these preferences make "economic sense?" KTugman (1991, 1997) has argued
forcefully that they do not.'3 We therefore emphasize that Assumption 2 may be
related back to the model developed in Section 2, and that in this context these
preferences do indeed admit a simple economic interpretation. In essence, our
interpretation requires that each government's preferences are sufficiently sensitive
to the terms-of-trade implications of trade-policy choices at all tariff vectors in
A14
Tosee this interpretation, consider the preferences of the government of foreign
country i, and observe that part (i) may be re-written for this government as:
dn*z
wT*.t + >0. )dr P
As this expression reveals, a government's welfare is affected by its own tariff
through the effects that this tariff has on its local relative price and terms of
trade. The natural case (i.e., the case arising absent the Metzler paradox) is one
in which a higher tariff imposed by the government of foreign country i leads
to a lower local relative price in foreign country i (i.e., <0). Under the
assumptions of our basic economic model, it then follows that the government
of foreign country i prefers to increase its, own tariff provided that is not
too positive, so that the beneficial terms-of-trade consequences of such an act
overwhelm any possible negative effects that the associated local relative price
movements imply.
The sign of in turn indicates whether this government would prefer a
higher or lower local relative price, were mutual tariff adjustments undertaken
that maintained its world price. This evaluation is illustrated in Figure 1, where
the point C corresponds to the preferred local relative price for foreign government
i, given the world price (i.e., at point C, W =0).When is positive,
the local relative price is lower than preferred, which is to say that the foreign
government of country i would prefer more trade at the given world price (i.e.,
the tariffs rest at a point such as point D). With Assumption 2 we thus ensure
that, for all tariff vectors in AR, the government of foreign country i is never so
'3Ethier (1998) adopts this perspective as well. He imposes the behavioral assumption that
governments "do what they claim to be doing," but he does not attempt to develop an economic
interpretation for the presumed preferences.
14T}s interpretation is developed more fully in our earlier paper (Bagwell and Staiger, forth-
coming). It bears emphasis that the role of Assumption 2 is not to further restrict preferences
(beyond the restrictions described in Section 2), but rather to restrict the set of trade agreements
to which our stability analysis applies.
18eager to achieve more trade that it would be willing even to unilaterally lower its
own tariff and experience the corresponding terms-of-trade loss (i.e., Assumption
2 ensures that a movement from D to D' in Figure 1 is not appealing). We have
been careful to explain this reasoning in terms of the underlying local and world
price effects, since an understanding of these effects is important for what follows.
More broadly, however, we are simply requiring in part (i) of Assumption 2 that
tariffs are below their best-response values. The interpretation of the remaining
parts of Assumption 2 may be seen analogously.
Proceeding with this assumption and our reduced-form representation of gov-
ernment preferences, we now characterize efficient tariffs and assess the potential
for opportunistic bilateral agreements. We return to emphasize the underlying
interpretation developed above when we consider possible rules that may address
the opportunism problem.
4.2. Characterization of Efficient Tariffs
At an efficient set of tariffs, no one government can gain from an adjustment in
the tariff vector, without simultaneously reducing the welfare of at least one other
govermnent. An efficient vector of tariffs, (r, r, r, r2), must therefore solve
the following program:
Program W: Choose (rl,r2,r*l,r*2) to maximize i(T1,r2,Y*1,r*2)
s.t. *i(r1,r2,y*1,r*2) >'W' i*i(r,r,r1,r2),for i =1,2
We omit a formal analysis of this program, as the solution may be easily
characterized with the assistance of some simple figures. We begin by stating our
first proposition:
Proposition 1 (Efficient Tariffs): If (r,r,r',r2) is an efficient vector of
tariffs, then for i, j=1,2and ij,wemust have that
W*?W W
wT*.3 wT.iwT.1
Tointerpret the characterization, we refer to Figure 2. With r on the vertical
axis and r'' on the horizontal axis, we observe first that the iso—welfare curve for
19the home country government is positively sloped over the relevant region. This
simply reflects that the home government trades off a higher own tariff (which
is good) against a higher tariff from foreign country i (which is bad) when the
home country government's welfare is held fixed. The iso—welfare curve of the
government of foreign country i is positively sloped for the same reason. Second,
we observe that the iso-welfare curve for the government of foreign country jis
negatively sloped, since it benefits from an increase in either tariff. Third, we
observe that an efficient tariff vector leaves a lens in which the governments of the
home country and foreign country i could experience welfare gains.'5 Importantly,
we note that the lens lies below the iso—welfare curve of the government of foreign
country j.
Tounderstand the location of the lens, it is instructive to entertain the opposite
possibility in which the lens lies above the iso-welfare curve of the government of
foreign country j.Ifthis were the case, then it would be possible to raise the two
tariffs in a way that offered gains to all three governments. The governments of the
home country and foreign country i could obviously gain from such a maneuver.
Moreover, when these governments impose higher tariffs on each other's exports,
foreign country jexperiencesa terms of trade gain, and under Assumption 2 this
results in a welfare improvement for the government of this country. A more subtle
possibility is that there is no lens: the iso-welfare curves of the governments of the
home country and foreign country i are tangent at the point at which they intersect
the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j.Thisarrangement
fails to solve Program W as well, but a more involved alteration of tariffs is now
required to produce Pareto improvements. For example, raising Tandalong
the iso-welfare curve of foreign country i will cause the home-country government
to experience a second-order welfare loss, while generating a first-order welfare
benefit for the government of foreign country j.Adjustmentsto r- and r'-1can
then be found that ensure gains for all three governments.'6 Therefore, if the
vector of tariffs is efficient, then the lens indeed must lie below the iso-welfare
curve of the government of foreign country j,asdepicted in Figure 2.
each iso-welfare curve, the depicted arrows indicate the direction in which welfare rises.
16111thetangency case, the welfares of the governments of the home country and foreign
country j can be increased while maintaining the welfare of the government of foreign country i
if we adjust tariffs according to the following procedure: (i). increaser andsoas to preserve
W*t, thereby creating a second-order loss (first-order gain) for W (W*i); (ii). raise r3 and lower
7*Jsoas to preserve W*i, thereby creating a first-order gain (first-order loss) for W (W*); and
(iii). ensure that the first adjustment is large as compared to the second, thereby creating a
net gain for W. Specifically, it suffices to pick tariff changes that satisfy: dT*zE > 0,d-rt =
204.3. The Stability of Efficient Tariffs
We next consider the stability of efficient tariffs. We begin by noting that, under
Assumptions 1 and 2, no tariffs in AR are stable. This finding is immediate, since
the restrictions allowed in these assumptions permit the home government to raise
as part of its bilateral negotiation with the government of foreign country i.
Further, under Assumption 2, the home government and the government of foreign
country i both gain when the home government raises r3.
This observation motivates a further restriction on the rules of bilateral ne-
gotiations. In particular, a natural rule of negotiation is that a tariff concession
made in a previous agreement is "bound" and cannot be reversed in a subsequent
negotiation, unless the trading partner on whose exports the bound tariff applies
is represented. Such a restriction might be imposed in either of two ways. First,
it may be that the binding is strict: in any future bilateral negotiation with the
government of foreign country i, the home government is not allowed to alter the
tariff that it had previously agreed to apply to exports from foreign country j.
Alternatively, the binding may be weak, specifying only that the home government
is not allowed in such a future bilateral negotiation to raise the tariff that it had
previously agreed to apply to exports from foreign country j. The weak binding
case grants governments more freedom when conducting their bilateral negotia-
tions, and it is this restriction that is encoded in GATT (see Jackson, 1969, pp.
201-211). Either form of the binding restriction eliminates the potential of the
home government to "destabilize" an efficient agreement by later raising r3.
The following definition formalizes the two forms that the binding restriction
may take:
Definition (Bindings): Bindings impose the further restrictions on r, for
i,j=1,.2 and i
(A). if (12*1*2)Erjfrn,r2,r*l,r*2), then =
(B). if (1,2,*1,*2) rj(rl,r2,r*l,T*2),then< r3.
Part (A) of this definition captures the further restriction of a strict binding, while
part (B) corresponds to the further restriction of a weak binding. Below, when
we refer only to "bindings," we describe results that apply in either situation.
w*J w_
w•' w-i w•2w•3
—[-]e >0,dr=_e<0 and dr =[-fje>0, where >{zL} >0.
r'
w
21While the binding restriction prevents the government of the home country
from opportunistically raising r, this in itself is not sufficient to stabilize any
efficient tariff vector. As the discussion in the previous subsection suggests, the
governments of the home country and foreign country i can also gain in comparison
to an initial efficient tariff arrangement by lowering the tariffs that they apply to
one another (i.e., by moving into the lens). Formally:
Proposition 2 (Instability of Efficient Tariffs): Whether or not bindings are
imposed, no efficient tariff vector in AR is stable.
As Figure 2 indicates, the key point is that, by lowering the tariffs that they
apply to one another, the governments of the home country and foreign country i
cause a terms of trade loss for foreign country j.Ineffect, the governments of the
home country and foreign country i convert this loss into their own gain, thereby
rendering unstable any efficient tariff combination, even when the tariff that the
home government applies to exports from foreign country jisbound (whether
weakly or strictly).17
At this point, we have identified a problem of bilateral opportunism that
emerges in tariff negotiations across multiple partners. The restrictions on ne-
gotiations that we have heretofore imposed upon the negotiation process are in-
capable of preventing this problem indeed, every efficient tariff arrangement is
unstable. This motivates the search for additional rules by which negotiations
might be required to abide.
4.4. The Reciprocal Market Access Rule
Among the candidate rules that might be considered to solve the problem of bi-
lateral opportunism, perhaps the most natural rule is one which directly prohibits
a bilateral agreement that alters the welfare of any non-participating government.
In terms of Figure 2, such a rule would allow bilateral negotiations between the
17jlightof Proposition 2, it is interesting to consider as well whether any tariff vectors in
AR are stable in the presence of bindings. For inefficient tariffs in AR, there are three possible
cases to consider: we may have a downward directional lens, an upward directional lens, or no
lens at all between the home country and foreign country i. Instability clearly arises in the
first two cases. On the other hand, if there is no lens between the home country and either
of its foreign trading partners, then the initial agreement is stable in the presence of bindings.
Figure 2 suggests that such an initial agreement is likely to involve excessive (i.e., supra-efficient)
liberalization. This observation is analogous to findings reported by McAfee and Schwartz (1994)
in their analysis of bilateral contracting and manufacturer-retailer relationships.
22home country and foreign country i only over a set of tariffs that preserve the
welfare of the government of foreign country j.Whilesuch a rule is appealing
in the abstract, its practical merit is much less clear. In view of the many forms
that government welfare functions may take, could a rule of this nature ever be
defined in a practical way?
Progress in answering this question can be made by referring to the underlying
model of Section 2. Recall first that Assumption 1 places r1 outside the reach
of any bilateral agreement between the home country and foreign country i. We
may thus conclude that the welfare of the government of foreign country jwill
be unaffected by bilateral negotiations between the governments of the home
country and foreign country i, provided only that these negotiations do not alter
with untouchedby any bilateral negotiation to which foreign country j
isnot party, the fixed pi implies as well a fixed p* and therefore fixed welfare
for the government of foreign country j.Interms of Figure 2, the underlying
model of Section 2 therefore implies that the iso-welfare curve for the government
of foreign country jissimply the iso —p0 locusin this figure.'8
This suggests the consideration of an additional rule of negotiation which
would allow bilateral negotiations between the home country and foreign country
i only over a set of tariffs that preserve Thisrestriction would preserve the
welfare of the unrepresented government whenever two governments negotiate
bilaterally. Moreover, it can be given a simple interpretation as a "reciprocal
market access rule." This is because, with 'r determined outside the bilateral
negotiations between the home country and foreign country i, E1° will be preserved
if and only if the bilateral export and import volumes between the home country
and foreign country j(i.e.,the "market access" that each affords to the other) are
left unaltered.'9
18Formally, the slope of the iso-welfare curve of foreign country j in (Ti,r)space is
—[w;+w;] qI;. —
[w;+w;]cj ,
fromwhich we may confirm that the iso-welfare locus of the government of foreign country j is
given by the iso —plocus.
'91f p" and r are held fixed, then pJ =p/ris also fixed, and so both exports from
foreign country j to the home country (i.e., (p*3p')) and exports from the home country
to foreign country j (i.e., M3(jfi,p'°3)) are fixed as well. Going the other way, (2.3) for foreign
country j implies that, if both exports from foreign country j to the home country and exports
from the home country to foreign country j are fixed, then j5° is fixed, too. Finally, we note that
23We therefore consider the following definition:
Definition (Reciprocal Market Access Rule): The Reciprocal Market Access
Rule imposes the further restriction on r, for i,j=1,.? and ij:if(1,2, s1 *2) E
rj(Tl,T2,T*l,r*2), then
We may now state:
Proposition 3 (Stability and the Reciprocal Market Access Rule): Under
the Reciprocal Market Access Rule, every efficient tariff vector in AR is stable.
Proposition 3 implies that a negotiation rule which serves to prevent governments
from altering their market access relationships with countries not represented in
the negotiations stabilizes every efficient tariff vector. As Figure 2 reveals, starting
from an efficient tariff vector, a mutually beneficial bilateral agreement between
the governments of the home country and foreign country i is possible only if they
each lower their tariffs. This is not possible when we impose as well the reciprocal
market access rule, since the welfare of the government of foreign country jis
then preserved only if a reduction in r is balanced against an increase in r (or
vice versa). Any initial tariff agreement that is efficient is thus stable.
Notice that the effectiveness of this rule does not require a bindings restriction.
If the government of the home country were to increase r, then the reciprocal
market access rule would require that the level of protection between the home
country and foreign country i be increased in offsetting fashion so as to stabi-
lize andthe welfare of the government of foreign country jwouldstill be
maintained. The reciprocal market access rule therefore protects the welfare of
the non-participating government directly, and a bindings restriction is thus re-
dundant. Simply, bindings or not, there is no way for the governments of the
home country and foreign country i to experience mutual welfare gains through a
bilateral agreement, when the initial agreement is efficient and the welfare of the
government of foreign country jcannot be reduced.
An interesting consequence of Proposition 3 is that the fascination of actual
negotiators with "market access" concerns admits a simple economic interpre-
tation. In the present context, we may understand this concern as reflecting a
the market access rule must be reciprocal: as Srinivasan (1998) and Winters (1997) note in their
critique of McMiJlan's (1993) discussion of preferential trading agreements, if the negotiation
rule requires only that exports from foreign country j to the home country are unaltered, then
it need not follow that p is fixed.
24desire to ensure that bilateral negotiations do not erode the value of existing con-
cessions. More broadly, our analysis suggests that governments have a legitimate
basis from which to approach their multilateral trading relationships with the goal
of securing and then maintaining stable market access relationships with each of
their important trading partners.
While we emphasize throughout the stability properties of efficient tariff vec-
tors, it is interesting to observe that the reciprocal market access rule also desta-
bilizes every inefficient tariff vector. In other words, under the reciprocal market
access rule, a tariff vector in AR is stable if and only if it is efficient. To see this,
let us consider an inefficient tariff vector that gives rise to a downward directional
lens (as in Figure 2) for the governments of the home country and foreign county i.
The home government then has sufficient flexibility to create a mutually-beneficial
bilateral agreement, while still respecting the reciprocal market access rule. In
particular, it can lower r and then enjoy bilateral gains with the government of
foreign country i as they reduce their tariffs down into the lens. These adjust-
ments have competing effects for the government of foreign country j,andthese
effects can be arranged to ensure that, on net, the welfare of foreign country jis
unaltered. The governments of the home country and foreign country i can thus
engineer a bilateral agreement that enables them to enjoy some of the remaining
efficiency gains, without harming the welfare of the government of foreign country
j.Asa similar argument applies when the lens is upward directional, we conclude
that every inefficient tariff vector is unstable under the reciprocal market access
rule.2° The reciprocal market access rule is thus in some respects ideal: it ensures
that any initial efficient agreement is stable, and at the same time it does not
encumber efficiency-enhancing bilateral agreements.2'
20Ifthere is no lens (in either direction) for either bilateral relationship, then (i). the govern-
ments of the home country and foreign country i may increaseandT*isoas to maintain Wtt,
thereby creating a first-order gain (second-order loss) for W*3 (W); and (ii). the government
of the home country may raiser3 so asto achieve on net no overall change in W, thereby
creating a first-order gain for W and W. These adjustments satisfy the reciprocal market
access rule and offer first-order gains to W and Wt.
21v,pjien coupled with a bindings restriction, however, the reciprocal market access rule does
not destabilize all inefficient arrangements. For example, when negotiations are restricted by
the reciprocal market access rule and a strict bindings rule, all tariffs in AR are stable. This is
because the government of the home country is prevented under strict bindings from entering
into a bilateral agreement and then adjusting 3topreserve the welfare of the non-participating
foreign government. Under the reciprocal market access rule and a weak bindings rule, inefficient
tariff vectors are stable when they are characterized by an upward directional lens. The weak
binding restriction then precludes a welfare-preserving tariff increase that applies to the exports
25Nevertheless, there are important practical problems with the reciprocal mar-
ket access rule. Primary among them is that the implementation of this rule
would require something akin to multilateral representation in bilateral negoti-
ations. This is because, when negotiating a bilateral agreement between them-
selves, the governments of the home country and foreign country i must consider
the consequences of this agreement for the import and export volumes of the non-
participating foreign country j,andany negotiated changes in Ttandr'' must
be accompanied by potentially subtle changes in r3topreserve existing market
access relations between the home country and foreign country j.22
The"multilateralization" of bilateral bargains that is effectively required by
the reciprocal market access rule is not necessarily an insurmountable problem.
Indeed, though GATT does not contain an explicit reciprocal market access rule,
it may be argued that member governments can gain representation to a bilateral
negotiation implicitly through Article XXIII:l (b). Under this Article, a member
government is entitled to redress if it can show that a GATT benefit accruing
to it is being nullified or impaired as the result of "...the application by another
contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions
of this Agreement...". Hence, a government may resort to filing a "non-violation"
complaint if it believes that its interests have been compromised by the (lawful)
negotiations of others, and in this way Article XXIII:l (b) might serve as an
implicit reciprocal market access rule.23 However, while such complaints may
provide a useful second line of defense, they are likely to be cumbersome as a
means to provide the primary assurance that market access relations implied
by existing tariff commitments won't be eroded by tariff commitments made at
some point in the future. It is therefore important to search for more practical
alternatives to an explicit reciprocal market access rule which, if adopted as rules
of negotiation, might supply this primary assurance.24
of the non-participating foreign country.
221n this respect, the reciprocal market access rule shares the same problems that are often
attributed to the Kemp-Wan (1976) rule that has been proposed for the treatment of preferential
trade agreements.
23Alternatively, a government might be able to obtain multilateral representation directly,
by securing a "third seat" at an essentially bilateral bargaining table. A good example of
this may be found in Canada's decision to participate in the US-Mexico FTA negotiations, a
decision which led to the creation of NAFTA. As Canada already had a free-trade pact with
the United States and is not a major trading partner with Mexico, we may interpret Canada's
participation as reflecting its desire to influence the bilateral negotiation directly and thereby
preserve its market access with the United States.
241n fact, the broader notion that explicit GATT rules are in place to serve as a primary guard
26In this regard, an intriguing candidate rule by which to stabilize market access
relations against erosion in future negotiations is the MFN rule. After all, by
requiring that T =r3,the rule of MFNintroducesa direct and readily verifiable
link between the market access concessions that the home government offers to
foreign country i in bilateral negotiations between them, and the market access
concessions that the home government must extend as well to foreign country j.
And intuitively, the implied promise to extend to janyfuture tariff concessions
negotiated with i would seem to go a long way toward assuring jofits existing
market access relations with the home country, thereby perhaps replicating the
essential feature of the reciprocal market access rule. The success of the MFN
rule in performing this function is the topic of the next section.
5. Efficient Tariffs and Negotiation Rules in MFN Environ-
ments
We turn now to the situation in which both the initial tariffs and the tariffs asso-
ciated with any future bilateral negotiation must conform to the MFN rule. We
begin by representing the government welfare functions for the MFN environment
in reduced form.
5.1. Government Preferences in Reduced Form
We first formally define the restriction of MFN:
Definition (MFN Rule): The MFN Rule imposes the further restriction that
AR ={(Tl,r2,Y*l,T*2)IT' = T}.
Notice that the MFN rule operates at two levels. First, we consider only initial
tariff vectors that conform with the MFN requirement. Second, any future bilat-
against the erosion of concessions, and that recourse to non-violation complaints provides a
useful but secondary backup procedure, is well-reflected in the writings of GATT legal scholars.
For example, Petersmann (1997, p. 136) observes that "...the function of most .GATT rules
(such as Articles 1-111 and XI) is to establish conditions of competition and to protect trading
opportunities...", and then concludes his review of the 14 dispute settlement reports examining
non-violation complaints as follows: "...These panel reports illustrated that the non-violation
complaints can strengthen the function of GATT, as well as of the WTO, as a negotiating
forum by offering additional safeguards against the impairment of.. .market access commitments
through unforeseen subsequent policy measures that are not prohibited by GATT/WTO law."
(p. 171).
27eral negotiation that is conducted under the MFN rule is also restricted to include
only MFN tariffs (since r maps to subsets of AR).
When the home government is restricted by the MFN requirement, the total
number of tariffs is reduced to three: r r2 r and T*2.Forthis sit-
uation, we may define the reduced-form preferences for governments as follows:
'vV(r y*ly*2)W(r, r, T*2)W(p,T) and W*i(T, T*2)tX*i(r,r, r', T*2)=
W*(p*z,p), where all prices and terms of trade are evaluated at their market-
clearing levels. Recall from Section 2 that, under the MFN restriction, there will
now be a single world price, and so we also have that T =p'
In analogy with Assumption 2 for discriminatory tariff environments, we now
add to our basic restrictions (Assumption 1) an additional assumption in order
to restrict attention to MFN tariffs for which externalities can be unambiguously
signed:
Assumption 2' (Externalities: MFN): We restrict AR to include only tariffs
for which,for i,j=d,2 and ij:
(i).Wr > 0 and W > 0;
(ii). W <0 and W.T*i <0; and
(iii). W > 0.
Thus, we consider negotiated MFN tariffs at which each government would prefer
to unilaterally raise its tariff, each government experiences a welfare reduction
when its export good is confronted with a higher tariff from a trading partner,
and foreign government i is pleased when foreign government jraisesits tariff
on the exports of the home country. As before, these assumptions are consistent
with the preferences which governments take into trade negotiations, and the
assumptions admit an economic interpretation if governments' preferences are
sufficiently sensitive to the terms-of-trade implications of trade-policy choices at
all tariff vectors in AR.
5.2. Characterization of MFN-Efficient Tariffs
Our goal is to assess the stability of tariffs that are efficient in the MFN environ-
ment. We must therefore characterize the set of tariffs that are efficient in the
MFN class. The efficient tariffs characterized in the previous section for which
=areof course also efficient in the MFN class, but a tariff vector that is
efficient in the MFN class need not be efficient in the full class of (discriminatory)
28tariff vectors. Formally, an MFN-efficient vector of tariffs, (Tm,T', r),must
solve the following program:
Program MFN —W:Choose (T,T,T*2) to maximize W(r, T*l, r2)
s.t. W*i(TT*2)> WW*i(Tm,Tn1,7n2), for i =1,2
As compared to the characterization of efficient tariffs when discrimination is
allowed, the lack of two independent home-country tariffs under the restriction
of MFN complicates somewhat the characterization of the set of MFN-efficient
tariffs. Consequently, while we continue to rely heavily on a series of figures to
illustrate the main points, we provide a formal analysis of this program in the
Appendix. We establish there that:
Proposition 4 (MFN-Efficient Tariffs): If (Tm, T, r) is an MFN-efficient
vector of tariffs, then we must have that either:
(i). W >0, and for every i E {1,2}, > > andW >0;
(ii). %<0,and for every i E {1,2}, > > andW <0; or
(iii). W =0,and
(a). for every i e{1,2},'-=, and
(b). there exists i E{1,2} such that = andW =0.
To interpret this proposition, let us first suppose that W >0.In the MFN setting,
this means that the government of the home country prefers a higher local relative
price and thus less trade volume, taking as given the world price. Proposition
4 then requires that W >0for each i E {1, 2}, which is to say that the
government of each foreign country prefers a higher local relative price and thus
greater trade volume, taking as given the world price. The cases in which W <0
and W2, =0can be interpreted similarly. The essential content of the proposition
is thus that, for an MFN-efficient vector of tariffs, if the government of the home
country seeks less (seeks greater) trade volume, then the government of each
29foreign country seeks greater (seeks less) trade volume, while if the government of
the home country achieves its preferred trade volume, then the govermnent of at
least one of the foreign countries must achieve its preferred trade volume as well.
Why is this so? We can understand the essential logic with reference to the
illustrations in Figures 3A, B, and C. With ronthe vertical axis and r on
the horizontal axis, we depict in these illustrations the iso-welfare curves of the
governments of the home country and foreign country i. These curves are upward
sloping under Assumption 2'. Depicted as well is the corresponding iso—° locus.
When T and r' are adjusted in a fashion that maintains the world price, the
welfare of the government of foreign country jisunaltered. In other words, the
iso-p locus represents the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country
j.25Thiscurve is also upward sloping under Assumption 2'.
Consider now the relationship between the slope of the iso-p locus and the
slopes of the iso-welfare curves for the governments of the home country and
foreign country i. The iso-p" locus is steeper than the iso-welfare curve of the
government of the home country if and only if —[W.1/W] < —[/],or
equivalently [W,-/W.] < Therelationship between the slope of the
iso-p locus and that of the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign coun-
try i can be characterized in exactly analogous fashion. Furthermore, as Figure
3A suggests, the iso-p locus is steeper than the iso-welfare curve of the home
government if and only if the government of the home country would seek less
trade, when taking as given the world price (corresponding to point H).26 Gen-
eralizing this logic, we find that the iso-welfare curve of the government of the
home country is flatter than (steeper than) (tangent to) the iso-p' locus if and
only if W > 0 (Wi, < 0) (W =0).In analogous fashion, we may verify that the
iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country i is flatter than (steeper
25To confirm this, observe that the slope of the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign
[W*.-+W1 '
countryj is given by —-' = — 2 = —
W p2i P
26Formally,the iso-welfare curve of the government of the home country is flatter than the iso-
locus if and only if —[W./W,-j <—I/-1. Under the assumptions of our basic economic
model and Assumption 2', we may state this inequality in equiva'ent form as W,-. 5<W,-.
Butexploiting the structure of the model, this is in turn equivalent to
-w-w
[TX? TX? 1 1rTxr TX?IJ?.... TX? [VVpT+ VYpj 7 < VVpTT YVpj r v'pP
whichunder the assumptions of the basic economic model is true if arid only if W > 0.
30than) (tangent to) the iso-p locus if and only if> 0 (W;.', <0) (W.'. =0).
Finally, we consider the relationship between the slopes of the iso-welfare
curves for the governments of the home country and foreign country i. In r/i-
space, the home iso-welfare curve is steeper if and oniy if —/Wj > —[W
or equivalently [W,-/W.] > [W/W]. Thus, part (i) of Proposition 4, for exam-
ple, describes a situation in which the iso-° locus is steeper than the iso-welfare
curves of the governments of the home country and foreign country i, and the
iso-welfare curve of the government of the home country is steeper than that of
the government of foreign country i.
With these relationships in place, we now consider Figure 3A. This figure
illustrates the case in which W,> 0. The government of the home country seeks
less trade volume, given the world price, with its preferred outcome for the given
world price occurring at the point of tangency H. Proposition 4 then implies
that the government of foreign country i seeks more trade volume given the world
price, and this is also reflected in Figure 3A. Finally, Proposition 4 further requires
that the iso-welfare curve for the government of foreign country i is flatter than
that of the government of the home country, and as a consequence Figure 3A
depicts a lens that lies below the initial tariffs. Figure 3B presents the case where
W,. < 0. Here, the home-country government seeks more trade volume at the given
world price, with its preferred outcome for the given world price occurring at the
point of tangency labelled L. Proposition 4 then implies that the government of
foreign country i seeks less trade volume at the given world price, as Figure 3B
indicates. Finally, Proposition 4 indicates as well that the iso-welfare curve for
the government of foreign country i is now the steepest, and so Figure 3B depicts
a lens that lies above the initial tariffs.
The remaining case, in which W, =0,is represented in Figure 3C. The home-
country government achieves its preferred trade volume given the world price,
and Proposition 4 requires that at least one foreign government also achieve its
preferred trade volume. The three panels of Figure 3C depict the three possibilities
for the remaining foreign government.27 The bottom panel of Figure 3C depicts
27As the panels reveal, it is possible that an MFN-efficient tariff vector is characterized by
one bilateral relationship that is described by a tangency and another bilateral relationship
that is described by a lens. Alternative tariff arrangements can then be constructed that offer
a first-order gain to the welfare of the "no-tangency" foreign government, while imposing only
second-order losses upon the welfare of the other two governments. Given the restriction to MFN
tariffs, however, there are insufficient instruments to compensate both the home government and
the "tangency" foreign government for their second-order losses, and so the new arrangement
does not Pareto dominate the original arrangement.
31the case in which all governments are content with the trade volumes achieved
at the given world prices. There is thus no lens in this case. The tariffs that
support such an arrangement are of special interest, as they correspond to the
tariffs that governments would choose were they to "ignore" any terms-of-trade
effects of their tariff choices. Further, in the special case in which governments
maximize national income, these tariffs correspond to multilateral free trade. In
Bagwell and Staiger (forthcoming), we interpret these tariffs in greater detail, and
we refer to the MFN-tariff vector at which each government achieves its preferred
trade volume given the world price as the "MFN politically optimal tariffs." We
follow that convention here as well.
5.3. The Stability of MFN-Efficient Tariffs
We now consider the stability of an initial vector of efficient tariffs in the presence
of the MFN requirement. An immediate observation is that there is no risk of
bilateral opportunism if tariffs are required to conform to the MFN rule and
bindings are strict: in this case, the home government cannot alter its tariff in
subsequent bilateral negotiations, and so all tariff vectors in AR are stable. The
more interesting question is whether a bilateral opportunism problem arises when
bindings are weak, or when there are no bindings. This question may be answered
with reference to Figures 3A, 3B, and 3C.
Consider first Figure 3A. In this case, the MFN-efficient tariff vector cannot
be stable, so long as bindings are not strict, as the home government and the
government of foreign country i can negotiate a further reduction in rand'r
which yields a Pareto gain for them (i.e., moves them into the lens in Figure 3A)
at the expense of the government of foreign country j,whosuffers a reduction
in(a terms-of-trade decline). Hence, for MFN-efficient tariff vectors satisfying
W >0,there is a bilateral opportunism problem with or without (weak) bindings.
This case is of some special interest. Notice in particular that the government
of foreign country jisharmed, even though it does not alter its own tariff and
receives a non-discriminatory tariff reduction from the home country. To under-
stand, recall that in this case the governments of the foreign countries each desire
greater trade, while the government of the home country does not. The govern-
ment of the home country, however, will accept a greater bilateral trade volume
if this comes with an improved terms of trade. In a bilateral negotiation, this can
be accomplished if the government of foreign country i reduces its tariff "more"
than does the government of the home country (corresponding to a move into the
32lens in Figure 3A). This expansion in bilateral trade volume between the home
country and foreign country i, however, may "crowd out" trade volume between
the home country and foreign country j.28Inthe end, therefore, the government
of foreign country jexperiencesa terms of trade loss and also a possible reduction
in trade volume. Its welfare thus falls, despite the fact that its exports confront
a lower home-country tariff.
Consider next Figure 3B. Here the government of the home country seeks
more trade volume, while the government of each foreign country seeks less trade
volume. In this case, the government of the home country will accept less bilateral
trade volume as part of a bilateral trade agreement, if the volume reduction comes
with an improved terms of trade for the home country. This will be the case, if the
home country's tariff increases "more" than does that of foreign country i. As a
consequence of this bilateral maneuver, foreign country jexperiencesboth a terms
of trade loss and a possible undesired increase in its trade volume. In this way,
the upward lens represents a gain that the governments of the home country and
foreign country i may enjoy at the expense of the government of foreign country
j.Inthe absence of bindings, therefore, this tariff vector is unstable. On the
other hand, with weak bindings, Tcannotbe increased, and hence weak bindings
ensures the stability of this tariff vector. Hence, for MFN-efficient tariff vectors
satisfying W7., <0, there is a bilateral opportunism problem if and only if bindings
are absent.
Finally, consider Figure 3C. In this case, W =0,and efficiency then requires
as well that W. =0for some i ={1,2}, but not necessarily for both foreign
countries. The top panel of the figure depicts the case in which W > 0. The
governments of the home country and foreign country jthenface circumstances
analogous to those of the home country and foreign country i in Figure 3A, and
thus there is a bilateral opportunism problem with or without (weak) bindings.
The middle panel of Figure 3C depicts the case in which < 0, and here
the governments of the home country and foreign country jfacecircumstances
analogous to those of the home country and foreign country i in Figure 3B. Corise-
quently, there is then a bilateral opportunism problem if and only if bindings are
absent. Finally, the bottom panel of Figure 3C depicts the case in which w;= 0.
This is the case of MFN politically optimal tariffs. As the bottom panel of Figure
3C makes clear, the MFN politically optimal tariff vector exhibits no lens, and
28The export volume from foreign country j falls if the reduction in domestic production in this
country is not overwhelmed by the reduction in domestic consumption that the ternis-of-trade
loss implies.
33hence it is stable whether or not (weak) bindings are imposed. Hence, for MFN
politically optimal tariffs, there is no bilateral opportunism problem, regardless
of the nature of bindings.
We may now state:
Proposition 5 (Stability and the MFN Rule):
(A). Under the MFN Rule, an MFN-efficient tariff vector in AR is stable if and
only if it is politically optimal.
(B). Under weak bindings and the MFN Rule, an MFN-efficient tariff vector in
AR is stable if and only if: (i) W <0;or (ii) W =0and W <0for every
i ={1,2}.
As Proposition 5 indicates, the MFNruleoffers a partial solution to the problem
associated with bilateral opportunism. In the absence of bindings, the MFN
rule stabilizes only one MFN-efficient tariff vector; and when joined with a weak
bindings restriction, this rule stabilizes a subset of MFN-efficient tariff vectors
(namely, those in which the government of the home country seeks more trade
volume at fixed world prices). As a general matter, then, if the welfare of non-
participating govermnents is to be protected, the rules of bilateral negotiation
must be strengthened beyond the MFN (plus bindings) requirement.
5.4. MFN and the Reciprocity Rule
It is instructive at this point to recall the essential feature of the reciprocal market
access rule, and to assess why MFN fails to protect the welfare of non-participating
govermnents to the same degree. Under the reciprocal market access rule, the
welfare of the government of foreign country jisunaffected by any bilateral ne-
gotiation between the home government and the government of foreign country i
because p is unaltered. The restriction of MFN ensures that p =
butit does not guarantee thatis preserved as a result of a bilateral negoti-
ation between the governments of the home country and foreign county i, and
thus it cannot guarantee the welfare of the government of foreign country j.This
suggests that, in the presence of MFN, what is needed to replicate the essential
feature of the reciprocal market access rule is an additional rule which serves to
stabilize .Aswe now establish, GATT's rule of reciprocity can serve just such
a purpose.
As we have observed in Bagwell and Staiger (forthcoming), the GATT rule
of reciprocity can be naturally defined as a restriction under which governments
34consider tariff adjustments that generate equal changes in import and export vol-
umes for each negotiating partner when valued at existing world prices.29 An
important implication of tariff changes that conform to reciprocity is that these
changes imply fixed world prices between negotiating partners. Hence, in a dis-
criminatory environment, if the home government and foreign government i were
constrained in a bilateral negotiation to consider tariff choices that conform to
reciprocity, then their negotiations would be over tariff combinations that pre-
serve the world price ,j•30Indiscriminatory environments, therefore, reciprocity
is clearly distinct from the reciprocal market access rule, since the former fixes
p whereas the latter fixes .Butwhen reciprocity is joined with the MFN
restriction, the effects of reciprocity are multilateralized, so that pTh).1 =
isthen also preserved. It is therefore not surprising that, when governments are
held to MFN tariffs, reciprocity works just like the reciprocal market access rule
in addressing the problem of bilateral opportunism.
To state this formally, we first define the tandem restrictions of MFN and
reciprocity with the following additional restrictions:
Definition (MFN and Reciprocity Rules): The MFN and Reciprocity Rules
together impose the further restrictions that AR ={(r1,y2,r'1,r'2)=
}, andfor i=1,2, if (*i*2)Erj(r,r,r*i,r*2), then *i*2)
°(r,T*i,T*2).
Inanalogy with the reciprocal market access rule, we may now state the properties
of reciprocity in the presence of MFN:
Proposition 6 (Stability under the MFN and Reciprocity Rules): Under
the MFN and Reciprocity Rules, every MFN-efficient tariff vector in AR is stable.
The formal correspondence between the reciprocal market access rule and the
combined rules of reciprocity and MFN may be seen by comparing Propositions
29Reciprocity arises in GATT both as a norm in trade liberalization negotiations and as an
explicit rule when bindings are renegotiated to higher levels. We discuss further the role of
reciprocity in GATIT in our forthcoming paper.
30To see this, we may observe that an equal change in the volume imported from the home
country by foreign country i (i.e., M(p*z, ')) and the volume exported to the home country
by foreign country i (i.e., given market clearing and valued at the existing world
price, 0i)mustfrom the balanced trade condition (2.3) preserve the woEld price between these
trading partners (i.e.,
353 and 6. Proposition 6 restricts consideration to MFN-efficient tariffs, but aside
from this it is identical to Proposition 3.
We may thus conclude that the rules of reciprocity and MFN may be viewed
as working in tandem to mimic the effects of the reciprocal market access rule
and thereby serve to stabilize any efficient initial tariff vector. Wliile the recip-
rocal market access rule ensures that all efficient tariff vectors are stable with-
out restricting the instruments at the disposal of governments, it does demand
something akin to multilateral representation in bilateral negotiations. This re-
quirement is avoided with the combination of reciprocity and MFN, albeit at the
cost of restricting the available set of government policy instruments. In effect,
the MFN restriction serves as a simple means by which to "multilateralize" bilat-
eral negotiations, and reciprocity then ensures that the multilateral presence so
achieved is just sufficient to solve the problem of bilateral opportunism.3'
6. An Illustrative Two-Stage Negotiation Game
In this section we describe a simple two-stage multilateral negotiation game with
which to evaluate more fully the negotiation rules developed above. We posit
that the first stage involves a multilateral tariff negotiation among the three gov-
ernments, while in the second stage the home government may choose a willing
partner for a further bilateral tariff negotiation. The tariffs implemented by the
three countries are those that result from this two-stage process, and we explore
the consequences of different negotiation rules for the outcome of the two-stage
negotiation game.
We begin by describing the two-stage multilateral negotiation game. We sup-
pose that, in the first stage, the governments of the three countries bargain over
tariffs, and an initial tariff vector (r1,'r2, T*l,*2)inAR is determined. Then, in
the second stage, the home government chooses a foreign government with which
to engage in an additional round of bilateral negotiations. We assume that the
outcome of the bilateral negotiation is determined by the Nash Bargaining Solu-
31J is also interesting to observe the role played by bindings. When the rules of negotiation
are sufficiently developed so that the welfare of non-participating governments is preserved in
any bilateral negotiation, then bindings play no useful role. However, if the rules fall short
of securing the welfare of non-participating governments, as for example in the case of MFN
without reciprocity, then bindings can play a useful role, in that they can prevent governments
from opportunistically raising tariffs on trading partners in future bilateral negotiations from
which these trading partners are excluded.
36tion, as applied to a bilateral bargaining environment in which (i). disagreement
results in the selection of the status quo (i.e., first-stage) tariff vector, and (ii).
the feasible set of negotiated tariffs is defined by the basic restrictions and any
further restrictions that we impose through the mapping r. The tariff vector
(12 *1 *2) thatresults from the bilateral negotiation is then the outcome of
the two-stage negotiation game. In this way, second-stage negotiations determine
an outcome once first-stage tariffs are given. We thus say that a tariff vector is
attainable if it can be achieved as an outcome for some first-stage tariff vector. For
forward-looking (and patient) governments, we may thus simplify and represent
the first-stage bargain by the multilateral Nash Bargaining Solution, as directly
applied to the set of attainable tariff vectors.32
Consider now the nature of the bargaining outcomes under the specific nego-
tiation rules introduced above. Let us examine first the attainable tariff vectors
under the bindings restriction. If the first-stage negotiations yield a tariff vector
that rests on the efficiency frontier, as characterized in Proposition 1, then by
Proposition 2 this tariff vector will be destabilized by a further bilateral nego-
tiation between the home government and one of its foreign trading partners in
stage 2. Further, this stage-2 bilateral will leave the home government and its bi-
lateral negotiation partner at a tangency, which is inconsistent with multilateral
efficiency according to Proposition 1. An analogous argument confirms that the
efficiency frontier cannot be reached by negotiating in the first stage to a point
off the frontier. Consequently, when bindings alone are added to the basic nego-
tiation restrictions, no efficient tariff vector is attainable, and so our two-stage
negotiation game must yield an inefficient tariff vector.
If instead the reciprocal market access rule is imposed, then second-stage no-
gotiations must preserve the reciprocal market access relations between the home
government and the non-participating foreign government, and by Proposition 3
it follows that any efficient tariff vector negotiated in stage 1 will not be altered
through a bilateral negotiation in stage 2. Consequently, the entire efficiency
frontier is attainable under the reciprocal market access rule, and our two-stage
negotiation game must yield an efficient tariff vector when this rule is in place.
Finally, suppose that the tandem rules of MFN and reciprocity are imposed.
Now the home government is restricted to MFN tariff selections in both the first-
32For the points that we make below, it is not necessary to specify the disagreement point
that is associated with the first-stage bargaining process. One possibility would be the status
quo tariffs from a preceding and immodeled round. Note as well that we do not restrict the
first-stage tariffs to bear some relationship (e.g., through r)toany preceding tariff arrangement.
37and second-stage negotiations, while second-stage negotiations must conform to
reciprocity. But then Proposition 6 implies that any MFN-efficient tariff vector
negotiated in stage 1 will not be altered through a bilateral negotiation in stage 2.
Consequently, the entire MFN-efficiency frontier is attainable under the MFN and
reciprocity rules, and our two-stage negotiation game must yield an efficient tariff
vector within the class of MFN tariffs when these rules are imposed in tandem.
We may now state:
Proposition 7: In the Two-Stage Multilateral Negotiation Game, governments
will select inefficient tariffs when bindings alone are added to the basic negotia-
tion restrictions contained in Assumption 1, but they will select efficient tariffs
when the basic negotiation restrictions are strengthened to include the reciprocal
market access rule, and they will select tariffs that are efficient within the class
of MFN tariffs when the basic negotiation restrictions are strengthened to include
the tandem rules of MFN and reciprocity.
As Proposition 7 formalizes, the bilateral opportunism problem that we have
highlighted in previous sections can lead naturally to inefficient bargaining out-
comes, and the reciprocal market access rule and the tandem rules of MFN and
reciprocity can each be viewed as providing a solution to this problem.
7. Many Goods
We now briefly consider the extension of our analysis to a many-good setting. For
our purposes, the novel feature of this setting is that there are many relative world
prices even when MFN is imposed (i.e., under MFN, there are n —1relative world
prices in an n-good world). In this section, we briefly explore the implications of
this new feature.
To make our points as simply as possible, we restrict our attention to MFN
environments and consider the addition of a third good z to the two-good three-
country model analyzed above. We suppose that, like good y, good z is exported
by the home country to each of its two foreign trading partners. For the home
country, there are now two local relative prices, P1px/py and P2Pz/Py
furthermore, with tariffs restricted to conform to MFN, there are also two world
relative prices, p p/p and p pr/p'. Local relative prices for foreign
country i are similarly denoted byp/p and p' p/p for i = 1,2.
By Lerner's symmetry theorem, we may represent the home-country tariff policy
38with the ad valorem trade taxes t and t, with t > 0 (t <0) denoting an export
subsidy (tax). Letting (1 + t) and r(1+ t),we may then represent
home local prices in terms of world prices and tariffs: Pi = Pi(Tx,p') and
P2 TzP P2frz, p). Similarly, for foreign country i, we represent tariff policy
with the ad valorem trade taxes t and t for i =1,2,with t > 0 (t < 0)
denoting an export subsidy. With T(1+ t) and T(1+ we may then
writep =prp(r',p') andp =T'p' pi(y*i,p))for i =1,2.As these
expressions indicate, local prices are determined, once tariffs and world prices are
given.
As in our two-good model, each country's production, consumption, import
and export quantities are determined, once tariffs and world prices (and hence
local prices) are given. Under a set of tariffs satisfying MFN, the balanced-trade
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As before, market clearing in the y market is assured by (7.1), (7.2) and (7.3).
Summarizing, with their selections of tariffs, governments determine the equilib-
rium world prices, and this in turn implies the equilibrium values for all local
prices and quantities.
Finally, we extend our representation of government preferences to the three-
good case. Under MFN, this representation takes the form of W(pi,p2, ,) for
the home government and W*i(p, p, ,) forforeign government i= 1,2. As
in our two-good model, we suppose that, with local prices held fixed, each govern-
ment strictly prefers an improvement in its terms of trade: W (Pi,p2,) <0;
Wo(p1,p2,',') > 0 and > 0; < 0 for
i =1,2.In addition, we now assume that these world price movements are valued
39by governments for their monetary implications alone. With this additional struc-
ture, we rule out the possibility that a government might care about the level of
a particular world price for reasons (e.g., "national status") that are independent
of its revenue consequences.
We are now ready to establish three results. We begin by showing that reci-
procity in combination with MFNcontinuesto eliminate the opportunities for
two countries to destabilize an MFN-efficient multilateral trade agreement for
terms-of-trade advantages. In the two-good case, this followed directly from the
observation that, in the presence of MFN, reciprocity fixes j5W.Withmore than
two goods, individual world prices may change even when reciprocity is satisfied.
However, we now establish that the permissible changes in world prices that result
from the negotiations can have no direct welfare consequences for the negotiating
governments.
To see this, suppose that the governments of the home country and foreign
country i were to consider further negotiations starting from a set of MFN-efficient
tariffs for the three governments. Denoting by "'"the new magnitudes to which
these governments negotiate, reciprocity imposes the following restrictions on the






Utilizing the balanced-trade conditions that must hold before and after the bilat-
eral negotiations, the reciprocity restrictions can be rewritten as:
--- =0; (7.6)
and
— — — = 0. (7.7)
Clearly these conditions are met when both j5'j' and 5' are unchanged as a result
of the bilateral negotiations. These conditions may also be satisfied when both
j5' andare changed as a result of the bilateral negotiations, but all of the per-
missible world price changes share a special feature. Specifically, (7.6) and (7.7)
imply that, in combination with the new local prices, the new world prices must
deliver the same tariff revenue to each negotiating country as would have been
40delivered if these new local prices had been combined with the old world prices.33
As a consequence, the permissible changes in world prices that result from bilat-
eral negotiations under reciprocity can have no direct welfare consequences for
the negotiating govermnents. In this way, reciprocity and MFN continue to elim-
inate the opportunities for countries to destabilize an MFN-efficient multilateral
trade agreement for terms-of-trade advantages in a many-good world, just as these
tandem rules did in the two-good case.
We now come to the second result of this section: with many goods, there
arises an additional problem of bilateral opportunism. This new problem of bilat-
eral opportunism is conceptually distinct from the terms-of-trade problem, and
it is related instead to the desire to achieve mutually advantageous changes in
local prices through a bilateral negotiation. The point is simply that, while the
permissible changes in world prices that result from bilateral negotiations under
reciprocity can have no direct welfare consequences for the negotiating govern-
ments, these world price changes may nevertheless have indirect welfare effects
through the local-price movements that they make possible. It is therefore con-
ceivable that, starting from a set of MFN-efficient tariffs for all three governments,
the home government and that of foreign country i could undertake bilateral nego-
tiations to lower their tariffs in accordance with MFN and subject to reciprocity
in a way that yielded mutually beneficial changes in local prices, of course at
the expense of foreign country j.34Asa consequence, even while MFN and reci-
procity continue to solve the terms-of-trade problem of bilateral opportunism in
a many-good world, there are now additional "local-price" advantages that can in
principle tempt countries into destabilizing bilateral negotiations.
Our third result is to establish that, under MFN and reciprocity, the remain-
ing opportunities for destabilizing bilateral negotiations in a many-good world
are relatively limited, in the sense that they arise only at certain points on the
efficiency frontier. To see this, note that, beginning from any set of MFN-efficient
33This can be seen by adding and subtracting p'1 (p'2)inside the first (second) bracket of
(7.6), and adding and subtracting p' (pr') inside the first (second) bracket of (7.7), and then
rearranging these expressions.
example, suppose that, owing to the bargaining power of foreign country j, the gov-
ernment of foreign country i had failed through multilateral negotiations to secure a mix of
imports from the home country which were tilted away from one of its most politically sensi-
tive sectors. In this case, the government of foreign country i might, through further bilateral
negotiations with the home government, be able to "worsen" the mix of imports that foreign
country j receives, and thereby achieve a more favorable import mix for itself while still satisfying
reciprocity.
41tariffs, a necessary condition for the home government and that of foreign country
i to gain from a bilateral agreement is that world prices do in fact change as a re-
suit of their negotiations (since otherwise no welfare is appropriated from foreign
country j).Inthis case, the two restrictions (7.6) and (7.7) implied by reciprocity
may be combined, together with the balanced trade condition, to yield:
M;"/E =M:'/E=E2'/M. (7.8)
Hence, whenever reciprocity is satisfied and world prices also change, we may
represent the restriction of reciprocity as contained in (7.6) and (7.7) by the
equivalent conditions (7.6) and (7.8).
Condition (7.8) is illuminating. It says that, if the home government and that
of foreign country i succeed in altering world prices in a reciprocity-consistent
fashion as a result of their bilateral negotiation, then their resulting trade patterns
must satisfy a "proportionality" condition, so that the fraction of home-country
exports of good y and of good zwhichforeign country i accepts is the same as
the fraction of home-country imports of good x which foreign country i supplies.
This condition would be satisfied automatically in equilibrium in a two-country
world (where each fraction would be one).35 But with three or more countries,
condition (7.8) imposes an additional restriction (beyond (7.6)) on the local-price
combinations that are attainable when bilateral negotiations alter world prices
but still satisfy reciprocity.
Whether the feasible combinations of local prices consistent with (7.6) and
(7.8) can provide mutual welfare improvements for the two governments will de-
pend on circumstances. For example, if countries had negotiated to a point on
the efficiency frontier at which the proportionality condition implied by (7.8) was
initially satisfied, then the restriction that this condition must also be satisfied
after bilateral negotiations which alter world prices might not be so severe, and
a destabilizing bilateral negotiation might well be feasible under MFN and reci-
procity. But if the point on the efficiency frontier to which countries had initially
negotiated implied trading patterns that were sufficiently far away from satisfying
the restriction in (7.8), then this requirement is likely to severely undermine the
attractiveness of further bilateral negotiations. In such circumstances, there is
unlikely to be a serious problem of bilateral opportunism if the rules of MFN and
reciprocity are applied.
35As may be confirmed by inspection, in a two-country world (7.6) and (7.7) collapse to a
single condition as well.
42Hence, in providing a solution to the terms-of-trade-driven bilateral oppor-
tunism problem, the tandem rules of MFN and reciprocity can be viewed as
solving the most pervasive problem associated with bilateral opportunism in a
many-good environment. More speculatively, we return to our discussion at the
end of Section 4 and note that, because the opportunities for bilateral oppor-
tunism that remain in the presence of MFN and reciprocity are fairly limited,
they might be adequately handled by the ability of third-countries to file non-
violation complaints of nullification and impairment under Article XXIII: 1 (b).
8. Conclusion
Trade negotiations occur over time between many governments. Given the on-
going nature of such negotiations, a government may naturally fear that the extent
of market access that it has secured in a current negotiation may be diminished in
a future negotiation to which it is not party. Indeed, if a government recognizes
the potential for an "opportunistic" bilateral negotiation in the future, then it
may be unwilling to offer significant concessions in a current negotiation. As
this discussion suggests, the degree to which the rules of a multilateral trading
system protect through time the value of concessions is of central importance to
the functioning of the system.
In this paper, we offer a formal analysis that characterizes the scope for op-
portunistic bilateral negotiations under different negotiation rules. Working with
a three-country general-equilibrium model, we begin by showing that the oppor-
tunism problem is potentially severe: in the absence of rules that govern the
nature of bilateral negotiations, every initial efficient agreement is vulnerable to
a future bilateral negotiation that benefits the involved parties at the expense of
the non-participant. We next identify a "reciprocal market access" rule, under
which no initial efficient agreement is vulnerable to a future bilateral agreement.
While this rule has desirable theoretical properties, it also has practical limita-
tions. We thus consider next various negotiation rules that are prominent in
GATT discussion and practice. Our main finding is that the tandem rules of
reciprocity and non-discrimination (MFN) effectively mimic the reciprocal mar-
ket access rule: if the future bilateral negotiation is constrained by the rules of
reciprocity and MFN, then the bilateral negotiation cannot alter the welfare of
the non-participating government. As a consequence, no initial agreement that
is efficient within the MFN class is vulnerable to a future bilateral negotiation,
when the bilateral negotiation is required to respect these rules.
43Our results suggest that reciprocity, which is often maligned as a mercan-
tilist distraction, may in fact serve a useful role in trade negotiations when exer-
cised in the presence of non-discrimination. At the same time, preferential tariff
agreements, which are permitted under the special exception to MFN granted by
GATT's Article XXIV, represent a likely route to opportunistic bilateral negotia-
tions, especially when reciprocity and MFN would otherwise combine to prevent
such opportunism. In this light, preferential tariff agreements may present a
natural and appropriate target for "non-violation" nullification-and-impairment
complaints, and the ability to bring such complaints through Article XXIII may
in turn play an important role in diminishing the attractiveness of preferential
agreements as a route to bilateral opportunism.
Finally, while we have emphasized the properties of reciprocity in an MFN
environment with regard to the problem of bilateral opportunism, the fact that
the welfare of non-participating governments is preserved under these rules has a
flip side as well: when combined with reciprocity, the "free-rider" problem often
associated with MFN does not arise. A formal analysis of the free-rider problem
requires a model of the decision of whether or not to participate in negotiations.
We leave these and other tasks for future work.
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10. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5 (MFN-Efficient Tariffs): To prove this proposition,
we first identify some general relationships and then establish three lemmas. We
observe that for every i,j{1,2} with ij,wehave:
(Al). Wr =[Wr+ Wpu]+Wp°>0
(A2). W.,. =[Wr+ <0
(A3). W.= +W] —W;()2>0
(A4). Wr*Z = +w]E<0
A5 f*i —1w*i._1 > 0 \1 — I p T pWJ Or" '
46where the expressions are signed in accordance with Assumption 2'. Using these
expressions, we next derive that:
8p
(A6). = 0L* >0
W , 8r2
(A7).'-= —b- <0 w"rS
— —- to — *3
(A8)--=---=--
I'V. I'V3 I'V •. 14' , 7*t r 7
iii'*i
(A9). --'---— = --- — —— = p**_7 t
147"1V' 147' 7 7 F 8r* 7 Or"
Opto wW*i.(±)2
(A 10). ---
—= -- — --- = " -
W.I'V" 14'" 14'" 7 *3 73 r2
Weconsider next the first-order conditions of Program MFN —W.At an
MFN-efficient tariff vector, there must exist multipliers ) >0and A2 ￿ 0 such
that:
(All). Wr + A1Wj + A2W2 =0,
(Al2) W,-. + A1W'1 + A2W21 =0and
(A13). W2 + A1W2 + A2W2 =0.
To characterize the MFN-efficiency frontier, we proceed exhaustively through
three cases: W. >0,W <0and W =0.Our findings are summarized in
the following three lemmas:
Lemma Al: Suppose W >0at an MFN-efficient set of tariffs. Then, for every
i e{l,2},




Proof:Given W >0,the first inequality follows directly from Assumption 2'
and (A8). To establish the other inequalities, we use the first order conditions for
(i.e., (All)) and r (i.e., (Al2) or (Al3), as appropriate) to solve for A3 and
A. Using (A7), these solutions may be written as:
______ (Al4).A[zZ!.]ft 7
2
47(A15). A. = [-'-]__ w*.opr[]W.r
As A, must be non-negative and finite, the first inequality established above to-
gether with Assumption 2' imply that
(A16). —-> -'--, E:
which under (A9) is equivalent to >0.
It remains to show that >-. Using(A14), (A16) and Assumption 2',
we see that A > 0 requires J—￿ and so we have only to eliminate the case
of equality. To this end, we use the first order conditions for r and r' to solve
for A3 and A. Then using (A6), we calculate that A3 may also be expressed as
opwiw•
(A17).A = [4] —. w'. w-'. w. '-"
w*3 w•i
Wenext use (A14) and (Ai7) and derive that
3.- *t __
(A18).[—--= --] + —
EW . WW3 W. W W op op w
Or*j rJr 35.j 3.j r
Let us now suppose that= Thengiven (A16) we see that (A18) reduces
toQE j.i (A19). --—=0, OpW
which under (AlO) requires W = 0. But this contradicts our finding above that
>0.Hence, —>-,andthe lemma is proved.
Lemma A2: Suppose W <0 at am MFN-efficient set of tariffs. Them, for every
i E {1,2},
> -=-—>and W <0.
48Proof: Given W <0, the second inequality follows directly from Assumption 2'
and (A8). Using (A15), )jnon-negativeand finite then implies -> -, which
with (A9) yields W <0.Next, (A14) now implies that > p—. Finally,
suppose=i'-. Then,using (A18) we may again derive that (A19) must
hold, whence under (AlO) it follows that=0,a contradiction.
Lemma A3: Suppose W,, =0at an MFN-efficient set of tariffs. Then:
(i). for every i E{1,2},
T 9r
Wr*iar
(ii).there exists i E{1,2} such that
=—-- andW* =0.
W.T
Proof:Given W =0,part (i) follows directly from (A8). Consider next part
(ii). Using the finding from part (i), we the necessary MFN-efficiency condition
(A18) may be rewritten as
—1T[___ — ____ — —LjJL,j JLW*3 T 19r T Or"
Butthe first term is positive, under (A9) the second term is zero if and only if
=0,and under (AlO) (after reversing the "i's" and "i's") the third term is
zero if and only if w,0.Since the second or third term (or both) must be
zero, the lemma follows.
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